France’s Heightened Polarization: Macronism’s Paradoxical EffectFrance’s Heightened Polarization: Macronism’s Paradoxical Effect Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 election on a platform of ending political divisions has paradoxically led to heightened polarization in France. Seven years later, the National Assembly is more polarized than ever, with the Gaullist right weakened, the left reinvigorated and shifted further left with the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP), and the far-right Rally National (RN) still influential. Polarization is evident in economic policies, with the NFP advocating for significant government spending, while the RN and the left favor rolling back Macron’s reforms. The green transition and migration policies also divide the political spectrum. Macronism has contributed to this polarization by isolating opponents and driving them toward extremism. However, deeper economic and sociological factors, including the electoral system, also play a role. The left’s alliance with the far-left France Unbowed has forced the socialists to adopt radical economic policies. Despite three camps lacking absolute majorities, coalition-building is necessary for a stable government. Macron has proposed dialogue and a “plural majority,” but this may face resistance from other parties. To form a viable majority, the left must moderate its economic program, and the voting system should be reformed to allow for independent party competition. Addressing the frustrations of far-right voters is crucial, as a third of voters supported RN in the elections. Political maneuvering alone will not suffice; concrete actions are needed to convince alienated voters that their concerns are being addressed. The reversal of polarization is essential for the future of France and Europe. Macronism’s paradoxical effect highlights the need for deeper reforms and a commitment to inclusive policies that address societal divisions.
French President Emmanuel Macron was first elected in 2017 on a promise to end the often artificial divisions between left and right. France had grown tired of theatrics between opponents who exaggerated their differences during election campaigns, only to govern in much the same way once in power. Macron’s radical centrism was intended to end the bravado, tap into good ideas from both sides of the political spectrum, and govern accordingly. It was intended to transform the left-right divide into a historical relic.
Seven years later, the results of this month’s general election show France even more polarized than it was in 2017. The right has shifted further to the right, with the previously dominant Gaullist camp reduced to fewer than 50 MPs, wedged between the far right and Macron’s centrist Ensemble (Together) coalition. Some of what remains of the right on Saturday is divided between Macron’s supporters and opponents.
Meanwhile, the once-hollowed left has rebuilt itself – and has moved much further to the left. Renamed the Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front, NFP), it is now the largest of the three main camps in the National Assembly, although it does not have an absolute majority and is far from homogeneous.
Economic manifestos are indicative of this polarization. Although France has the highest level of government spending of any advanced economy, the NFP’s program calls for €150 billion ($163 billion) in new government spending—4-5% of GDP—financed by an equivalent amount in taxes. Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rally National (RN) has softened the edges of its economic plans but is still considering leaving the EU’s single electricity market or rolling back Macron’s latest pension reform.
There are deep divisions over the green transition, with the RN campaigning to roll it back, while the NFP would accelerate it. And they are extreme on migration policy, with the RN embroiled in controversy after floating the idea of excluding binational citizens from certain public service roles.
Far from reducing political polarization, Macronism has had the paradoxical effect of discrediting centrist policies and pushing opponents toward extremism. This does not bode well for the future of French politics.
Was this outcome inevitable? In part, it reflects a style of government that has deprived opponents of political oxygen and left them little choice but to seek refuge in equally radical and mutually opposed quarters. But, as in the United States or other developed countries, French polarization has much deeper economic and sociological roots.
Despite extensive social protection, a high degree of redistribution and the major contribution of public services to reducing inequalities in access to health care, education and other essential services, France is a divided country where many citizens feel excluded. Moreover, the electoral system encourages radicalism, especially on the left.
To survive politically, social democrats have been forced into an electoral alliance with the far-left La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), which they oppose on a range of economic, social and foreign policy issues. Although the socialists campaigned for the European Parliament elections in June on a pro-European, social democratic platform, attracting some 40% more voters than France Unbowed, they had to align themselves with a fiscally irresponsible tax-and-spend platform for the national elections.
Things can change. Since all three camps (left, center and far right) are far from an absolute majority, some kind of coalition has to be formed to form a stable government. Moreover, each camp contains three or four factions. For example, the NFP consists of France Unbowed, the Socialists and the Greens, which can split. The game is therefore very open.
Macron distanced himself from his past behavior and acknowledged the new electoral landscape and its political logic. In an open letter to French citizens after the second round of the elections, he called for a “sincere and loyal dialogue” between political parties with the aim of building a “solid, necessarily plural majority.” Although other political camps rejected his proposal, it may eventually be implemented due to the lack of an alternative.
To form a new majority, however, a number of conditions must be met. The left, which has played the role of winner so far, must accept that coalition partners are unlikely to join its radical economic program. And to prevent the next government from being vulnerable to a parliamentary ambush, the voting system must be changed so that parties can compete independently in future elections and are no longer held hostage by their political allies. The issue is political, not constitutional, since the French system allows for the voting system to be changed with a simple majority.
The more fundamental challenge is to respond to the frustrations and grievances of those who voted for the far right. About a third of French voters supported RN in the parliamentary elections, and the number was much higher outside the big cities. Entire regions are now dominated by the far right.
Whether this pattern can be reversed is the overriding question for the future of France – and of Europe. If the results of the last French election are to be more than a temporary relief, political maneuvering will not suffice. Only action will convince alienated voters that their vote counts. — Project Syndicate
• Jean Pisani-Ferry, senior fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and senior non-resident fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, holds the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair at the European University Institute.
